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Russia Scattered the Ukrainians — and Connected Ukraine to the World

Russia tried to weaken Ukraine by scattering its people. It may instead have created a global Ukrainian network connecting Ukraine to the democratic world.

By Louis Baudry · · Updated · Ukrainian Diaspora

One of the favourite claims of Ukrainophobes is that Ukraine has already ceased to be a viable country because so many Ukrainians have left it.

The crudest version is: “Half of Ukraine has left the country.” The figure is false. It often mixes refugees abroad, internally displaced people, pre-war emigrants and movements across the border. One person who crosses the border several times may appear several times in statistics about crossings.

But the arithmetic is not the most interesting problem with the claim. Its deeper error is the assumption that a Ukrainian who lives abroad has simply been subtracted from Ukraine.

That is not how modern diasporas work. It is particularly inaccurate in the Ukrainian case.

Russia’s invasion forced millions of Ukrainians to seek safety abroad. This is a human tragedy and a serious demographic challenge. Ukraine has lost residents, workers, taxpayers and births that would otherwise have occurred inside the country. Families have been separated. Some refugees will settle permanently abroad, and some of their children may never live in Ukraine.

None of this should be minimised.

Yet displacement has also produced a result that Moscow did not intend. Millions of Ukrainians now live, work, study and establish relationships inside the world’s richest democracies. They earn money in stronger economies. They learn languages. They acquire qualifications and professional experience. They create businesses, associations and personal networks. They explain Ukraine to their neighbours, colleagues and elected representatives.

Russia wanted to weaken Ukraine by scattering its people. Instead, it has helped to create a global Ukrainian network.

Ukrainians abroad have not disappeared

At the end of 2025, approximately 5.86 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded worldwide, including about 5.3 million in Europe. This is a very large population, but it is not “half of Ukraine”. Nor is it a static population permanently detached from the country.

By September 2025, an estimated 1.4 million refugees had returned to Ukraine and remained there for at least three months. This measure is important because it does not count every short visit as a permanent return.

Short visits and repeated movements are much more common. UNHCR surveys found that about 52% of Ukrainian refugees surveyed by mid-2024 had visited Ukraine at least once. Many had travelled back more than once. They returned to see relatives, inspect homes, obtain documents, receive medical care or work temporarily.

This movement reveals a reality that conventional migration statistics struggle to represent. Millions of Ukrainians cannot be classified simply as either “in Ukraine” or “gone”.

Many divide their lives between two countries.

Their official residence or employment may be in Poland, Germany, Czechia or another European country. Their children may attend school there. But their parents, homes, financial responsibilities and part of their social life remain in Ukraine. They may work abroad for part of the year and spend another part at home. They may earn euros or złoty while renovating a house, supporting relatives or paying for services in Ukraine.

They have not necessarily emigrated in the traditional sense. They are living transnationally.

A human bridge into Europe

The physical movement of Ukrainians into the European Union has connected Ukraine to Europe at the level of everyday life.

European integration is often discussed through institutions, treaties and legislation. But integration also takes place through millions of personal relationships. Ukrainians now work in European companies, attend European universities, enrol their children in European schools and interact daily with European administrations.

At the same time, they remain in constant contact with Ukraine through digital communication, banking, travel and family ties.

Every Ukrainian family divided between Kyiv and Warsaw, Lviv and Berlin, or Odesa and Prague creates another durable connection between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. These relationships cannot replace formal membership of the European Union. But they create a social foundation for Ukraine’s integration that no diplomatic declaration could produce on its own.

The process also changes European societies. Before 2022, many Europeans knew little about Ukraine. They often viewed it through Russian cultural and political narratives. Today, millions of Europeans have Ukrainian neighbours, colleagues, employees, classmates and friends.

Ukraine is no longer an abstraction at the edge of Europe. It has acquired a human presence inside Europe.

Income earned abroad supports life in Ukraine

Remittances are the most visible economic link between Ukrainians abroad and their country.

According to World Bank data, personal remittances received by Ukraine were equivalent to approximately 6.3% of its gross domestic product in 2024. This figure covers transfers from Ukrainians abroad generally, not only people who left after February 2022. It should therefore not be presented as the contribution of wartime refugees alone.

Nevertheless, it demonstrates the economic importance of Ukraine’s population abroad.

Money sent to relatives pays for food, housing, healthcare, education and repairs. It supports consumption in Ukrainian towns and cities. Some Ukrainians abroad also finance vehicles, medical supplies, generators, drones and other assistance for the armed forces and local communities.

These transfers are decentralised. They do not depend entirely on government programmes or large international institutions. They pass directly through families, volunteer groups, businesses and local networks.

This makes the diaspora a form of economic resilience. When part of a family earns income in a stronger and safer economy, that income can help sustain another part of the family inside a country at war.

Workers, entrepreneurs and advocates

The Ukrainians who arrived in Europe did not remain economically inactive. By early 2026, 57% of Ukrainian refugees in Europe were employed, according to a UNHCR analysis. Their employment rate still remained below that of citizens of the host countries, and many worked below their qualification level. Even so, the direction is clear: a large displaced population is becoming integrated into European labour markets.

This has several possible long-term benefits for Ukraine.

Ukrainians abroad gain professional experience, learn how foreign administrations and businesses operate, and build contacts in sectors that will matter during reconstruction. Some create companies that trade with Ukraine. Others help Ukrainian businesses enter foreign markets. Engineers, doctors, researchers, translators, information technology specialists and tradespeople acquire knowledge that can later circulate back to Ukraine, whether or not they return permanently.

Their political role matters as well. Ukrainian organisations abroad raise funds, organise demonstrations, counter Russian disinformation and maintain pressure on governments to support Ukraine. Individuals do the same informally by explaining the war to colleagues, neighbours and local communities.

A Ukrainian living abroad may therefore contribute to Ukraine in several ways at once: as an employee, a taxpayer in an allied country, a sender of remittances, a volunteer, an advocate and a future investor.

Geographical absence is not the same as national absence.

Return does not have to be permanent to matter

Political debate often treats migration as a final decision. A person either returns to Ukraine or remains abroad. Reality is more flexible.

Some Ukrainians have already returned permanently. Others return for several months, then leave again. Some retain temporary protection abroad while regularly visiting Ukraine. Some families distribute their members across two countries according to employment, schooling, health and security needs.

This circular movement can transfer money, knowledge and habits in both directions. A person does not need to relocate permanently to contribute to reconstruction. Ukrainians abroad can invest in property, establish commercial partnerships, employ people in Ukraine, teach remotely or bring foreign clients to Ukrainian businesses.

Modern transport and communication allow a national community to function across borders in ways that were impossible for earlier diasporas. Ukraine’s future population may therefore consist of three overlapping groups:

The third group is easy to overlook because it does not fit traditional categories. Yet it may become one of Ukraine’s most important connections to Europe.

An opportunity, not an automatic victory

None of these advantages eliminates Ukraine’s demographic danger.

If large numbers of young Ukrainians settle permanently abroad, Ukraine will have fewer workers and taxpayers. If children complete their education in another language and lose their connection to Ukrainian life, return will become less likely. Remittances cannot raise children in Ukraine, staff hospitals or fill shortages in essential professions.

A diaspora becomes a strategic asset only when the country maintains active relations with it.

Ukraine will need policies that allow citizens abroad to preserve strong legal, educational, cultural and economic links with the country. Ukrainian children abroad need access to their language and history. Entrepreneurs need simple ways to invest and establish businesses. Professional qualifications acquired abroad should be recognised. Returning must be administratively easy, but continued participation should not require permanent return.

Ukraine should not force its citizens to choose between complete return and gradual assimilation abroad. It should make transnational Ukrainian life possible.

The objective should be connection: connection between families, schools, businesses, local authorities, cultural organisations and political institutions. The stronger these links remain, the less meaningful the distinction between Ukrainians “inside” and “outside” the country becomes.

Russia’s strategic failure

Russia’s war has killed Ukrainians, destroyed homes and forced millions to flee. The resulting demographic damage is real and may last for generations.

But the conclusion drawn by Ukrainophobes is too simple. Ukrainians abroad have not vanished. Many have returned. Many others divide their lives between two countries. They send money, support relatives, create businesses, acquire skills and build political influence. Their lives connect Ukraine directly to European societies.

This dispersed population could become a permanent economic and diplomatic infrastructure for Ukraine: a network extending across the European Union, North America and beyond, but still rooted in Ukrainian families, property, language and national identity.

Russia tried to depopulate and isolate Ukraine. It may instead have accelerated Ukraine’s integration into the democratic world.

Russia wanted to disperse the Ukrainian nation. Instead, it internationalised it.

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