Europe Is Rearming. But Who Is Actually Building the Weapons?

Europe is holding defence summits, announcing spending targets and warning that Russia could test NATO before the end of this decade.

But deterrence is not created by speeches or budget announcements.

It is created by factories producing shells, missiles, drones, armoured vehicles and spare parts—month after month, in quantities large enough to survive a prolonged war.

So, who is actually doing it?

Ukraine is Europe’s real wartime arsenal

The most important defence manufacturer in Europe today is not Germany, France or Britain. It is Ukraine.

Ukraine has been forced to compress decades of industrial adaptation into four years. According to Ukrainian government figures, more than 40% of the weapons used at the front are now domestically produced. Production of the Bohdana self-propelled howitzer has reached approximately 40 units per month, while Ukraine delivered 2.4 million mortar and artillery rounds in 2024.

Its drone sector is even more striking. By late 2025, Ukraine estimated that its manufacturers had the capacity to produce close to 20 million drones annually—provided that governments supplied enough financing and contracts.

This distinction matters. Production capacity is not the same as production. A factory without a funded order is merely potential.

Ukraine nevertheless provides Europe with something no peacetime procurement system can replicate: a defence industry receiving daily feedback from an actual battlefield.

Integrating that industry into Europe’s permanent defence base may be the quickest way to strengthen the continent.

Germany and the ammunition belt

Germany’s Rheinmetall is perhaps the clearest example of conventional industrial mobilisation inside the EU.

Its new ammunition plant at Unterlüß was constructed in roughly 15 months. The company says the plant is scheduled to supply approximately 140,000 artillery rounds during 2026 and reach annual capacity of 350,000 rounds in 2027.

Rheinmetall is also expanding production across Germany, Spain, Hungary and Lithuania. This is beginning to resemble an industrial network rather than a collection of isolated national factories.

A wider ammunition belt is emerging through Norway, France, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia:

• Nammo is expanding ammunition and rocket-motor capacity.
• Eurenco has reopened and expanded large-calibre propellant production.
• Czechoslovak Group and its Slovak subsidiaries are adding large-calibre ammunition-filling capacity.
• Poland is expanding the production of armoured vehicles, artillery and ammunition.
• Britain’s BAE Systems has restored domestic production of large-calibre gun barrels.

These companies are building the unglamorous components without which no weapons system functions: explosives, propellant, primers, motors, barrels and shell bodies.

Europe’s rearmament will ultimately depend as much on chemical plants and machine tools as on famous defence brands.

The missile manufacturers are accelerating

Europe’s missile houses are also increasing output.

MBDA says it doubled missile production between 2023 and 2025 and planned another 40% increase during 2026, supported by €5 billion of investment through 2030.

Germany’s Diehl Defence is expanding IRIS-T air-defence production, while Norway’s Kongsberg has opened a new plant for Naval Strike Missiles and Joint Strike Missiles.

This is critical because air-defence interceptors remain one of Europe’s most serious vulnerabilities. Russia can manufacture relatively inexpensive drones and missiles faster than Europe can comfortably replace many of the interceptors used to destroy them.

The economics of defence therefore matter. Europe cannot indefinitely answer a cheap attacking drone with a scarce, million-euro missile.

That is why companies such as Helsing are worth watching. Its new German plant was designed to manufacture more than 1,000 HX-2 strike drones per month. Europe needs both sophisticated weapons and large quantities of affordable, expendable systems.

Tanks, vehicles and ships are returning—slowly

KNDS is increasing production of CAESAR artillery systems, Leopard tanks, Boxer vehicles and France’s Scorpion armoured vehicles. Poland has ordered 111 domestically produced Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles.

France continues to produce Rafale combat aircraft and has begun delivering its new FDI frigates. Britain and France remain essential producers of high-end missiles, aircraft, submarines and naval systems.

However, high-end European manufacturing is still characterised by small fleets, long lead times and expensive platforms. These capabilities are indispensable, but they do not yet provide the mass required for a prolonged continental war.

Europe is also preparing physically

The industrial changes are being accompanied by a visible military posture.

Germany is establishing a permanent brigade of approximately 5,000 personnel in Lithuania, intended to be fully operational by 2027. NATO is reinforcing its eastern flank, while EU equipment procurement reached approximately €115 billion in 2025—26% higher than the previous year.

Those are substantial changes. Europe is genuinely rearming.

But it is not yet operating on a wartime footing.

The continent still depends heavily on the United States for intelligence, air-to-air refuelling, strategic transport, integrated air defence, long-range strike and parts of the logistics and maintenance system supporting American weapons.

It also suffers from fragmented orders, incompatible national requirements, shortages of trained personnel and political reluctance to award the long-term contracts manufacturers need before investing in new factories.

The real test

The emerging leaders of Europe’s conventional rearmament are increasingly clear:

Ukraine, Germany’s industrial base, the Nordic missile and ammunition manufacturers, Poland, and the Czech-Slovak ammunition belt.

France and Britain remain vital for high-end capabilities, but Europe’s ability to fight a prolonged land war will depend on whether it can combine that sophistication with industrial mass.

By 2029, three questions will matter far more than the size of any announced defence fund:

1. How many shells, drones and air-defence interceptors are actually being delivered each month?
2. How many brigades are fully staffed, equipped, maintained and ready to deploy?
3. Has Ukraine’s battle-tested defence industry been integrated into Europe’s permanent arsenal?

Europe has started moving.

The danger is that it is preparing for 2029 while Russia is already operating a war economy today.

Deterrence is not a press conference. It is a factory schedule that the adversary believes.

Selected primary sources: Ukraine’s domestic production, Rheinmetall’s Unterlüß expansion, MBDA’s production increase, Kongsberg’s new missile factory, NATO’s eastern-flank posture, and EU defence figures.